By Dr. Saman Shali
Unification of Peshmarga and Security Forces: What should the Kurdistan Regional Government do?
(Final Tenth Part)
This subject has often been written about due to the importance of this unification and its impacts on the future of the Kurdistan region's security. Unifying the Peshmerga forces in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is a complex and sensitive endeavor, as it involves merging armed groups with diverse histories, loyalties, and leadership structures. Achieving this unity requires careful planning, political will, and the cooperation of various Kurdish parties and factions. Here are some key factors and steps that may be necessary to unify the Peshmerga forces:
1. Political Consensus:
Achieving unity among the Peshmerga forces would require a broad political consensus among the different Kurdish political parties and factions in the Kurdistan Region. These parties should agree on the need for a unified Peshmerga and commit to the process.
2. Leadership Commitment:
Leaders of the major Kurdish political parties and factions must demonstrate a solid commitment to the unification process and be willing to set aside differences for the greater good of Kurdistan.
3. Mediation and Facilitation:
Engage neutral third parties, such as international organizations or neighboring countries, to mediate and facilitate the negotiation process. This process can help build trust among the parties involved.
4. Clear Objectives and Framework:
Define clear objectives for the unified Peshmerga forces, including their mission, structure, and chain of command.
Develop a framework agreement that outlines the terms of the unification, the role of each faction, and the governance structure.
5. Inclusive Dialogue:
Ensure that representatives from all Peshmerga factions, including those affiliated with different political parties, are included in the dialogue and decision-making process.
6. Security Sector Reform:
Conduct a comprehensive security sector reform to modernize and professionalize the Peshmerga forces.
Address issues such as command and control, training, equipment, and logistics.
7. Resource Allocation:
Address concerns related to the allocation of resources, including salaries, benefits, and funding for the unified Peshmerga.
Develop a transparent and equitable system for resource distribution.
8. Amnesty and Reintegration:
Provide amnesty and opportunities for the peaceful reintegration of former fighters who may have been part of rival factions.
9. External Support:
Seek international support and assistance to facilitate the unification process, including technical expertise and financial aid.
10. Community Outreach and Education:
Engage with Kurdish communities to promote the idea of a unified Peshmerga and explain the benefits of such unity in terms of security and stability.
11. Monitoring and Oversight:
Establish mechanisms for monitoring and oversight to ensure that the unified Peshmerga operates under established rules and standards.
12. Gradual Implementation:
Recognize that unification may not happen overnight and may require a phased approach to implementation.
13. Crisis Response and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms:
Develop mechanisms for resolving internal conflicts and disputes within the unified Peshmerga to prevent potential factional clashes.
14. International Guarantees:
Seek international guarantees to support and uphold the agreements reached during the unification process.
Unifying the Peshmerga forces is a complex and challenging process requiring patience, diplomacy, and a long-term commitment from all stakeholders involved. The goal should be to create a unified, professional, and well-trained force that can contribute to the security and stability of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
Suppose this matter remains in the hands of the two Kurdish parties. In that case, there will be no unification due to their interests and adherence to these forces to defend themselves first and then the region. Therefore, public pressure is required to force the two parties to give up these forces and become national forces under the leadership of the Ministry of Peshmerga and the regional government.
Previous Parts :
https://www.mirs.co/details.aspx?jimare=217
https://www.mirs.co/details.aspx?jimare=213
https://www.mirs.co/details.aspx?jimare=223
https://www.mirs.co/details.aspx?jimare=225
https://www.mirs.co/all-detail.aspx?jimare=81&fbclid=IwAR10ZOZf7R4rKeJcT42RmHu_YdgA4t67cC4PsdIyjhAztFEOTqaSBtiFoww
https://www.mirs.co/details.aspx?jimare=229
https://www.mirs.co/all-detail.aspx?jimare=82&fbclid=IwAR31XkPbMe_CDrWxsyRYqwa97V300JI_6jnzXkEegHNJE0Cu188BYzdysao
https://www.mirs.co/details.aspx?jimare=231
Saman Shali has a Ph.D. in Science (1981) from the University of Sussex. Dr. Shali worked as an Assistant Researcher and Assistant Professor at the University of Sussex, King Saud University, and Pennsylvania State University. He is also a senior fellow at the Mediterranean Institute for Regional Studies.